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I. INTRODUCTION
As the doomed airliner rumbled less than 30 feet above
ground, Jamin Duggan could see the look of terror on the
faces of passengers. "They were screaming and beating
on the windows," the ten year old boy said. Moments
later, United Airlines Flight 585 slammed nose first into a
dry creek bed, killing all 25 aboard, but avoiding a
crowded apartment complex about 150 yards away.
Layette Williams saw the same looks of horror on the pas-
sengers faces... "I was looking out the window. I jumped
back," said Williams, a housewife. "I could see the peo-
ple in the windows. At first, I thought she was waving at
me. She was screaming, bamming on the window."'
THIS TRAGIC plane crash in Colorado Springs exem-
plifies the extreme mental anguish that airplane pas-
sengers experience before a crash or impact. According
to all reports, these passengers were aware of their im-
I Michael Romano, 'They Were Screaming and Beating on the Windows' Passengers
Panicked As Crash Neared, Say Those Who Saw Them Through Jet's Windows, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS, Mar. 4, 1991, at 8. Strangely, the National Transportation Safety Board
never reached a conclusion on the cause of this crash, although most of the board
members suspected a horizontal tornado. This was only the fourth time in history
that the Board found no official cause for a commercial airline crash. John Brink-
ley, No Final Chapter in Springs Crash: Board Suspects Horizontal Tornado, But Finds No
Official Cause In Tragedy Fatal To 25, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 9, 1992, at 10.
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pending death and possibly experienced traumatic pain
and suffering after impact. Many courts have recognized
such post-impact physical pain and suffering, but pre-im-
pact mental anguish has only recently been recognized by
some state and federal courts. It is an emerging and con-
troversial concept in tort law.
In today's technologically advanced world, airplane
flight is a common occurrence and a necessity for most
people. The increased use of air transportation heightens
the possibility of airplane disasters. Commentators point
to several factors that might account for a recent increase
in the number of airline accidents. Airlines have been
slow to replace the aging airfleet, causing accidents to re-
sult from poor maintenance.2 Additionally, airlines are
"directing capital towards corporate survival ...rather
than replacing aging aircraft." '3 This economically based
accident theory gives the judiciary a reason to deny ex-
pensive pre- and post-impact claims. Such a judicial de-
termination might, however, be considered contrary to
the public policy of compensating injured victims.
Aviation litigation is an arena for new tort litigation and
theories. Experimental theories have emerged, stretching
common law tort concepts to their outward bounds. Pre-
and post-impact pain and suffering and mental anguish
recoveries are the newest theories expanding tort liability.
First, this Comment traces the evolution of pre- and post-
impact recovery theories, and second, it analyzes relevant
federal and state case law. The law currently emphasizes
the difficult issues surrounding mental injury, especially
injury that occurs before impact. Consequently, this
Comment focuses on this narrow issue. Finally, this Com-
ment outlines emerging trends and possible predictions
for the future.
2 Scott R. Paulsen, Choice of the Punitive Damages Law in Airline Accidents: The Chi-
cago Rule Comes Crashing Down, 15J. CORP. L. 803, 811 n.42 (1990).
Id.
19931 405
406 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
A. THE NATURE OF LIABILITY
In most cases involving airline accidents, the defendant
airline concedes liability.4 While airlines typically com-
pensate for physical injuries, plaintiffs now frequently re-
quest compensation for mental injuries and anguish.
"As a general rule an actor who negligently causes an-
other to suffer mental or emotional distress is not subject
to liability for such distress except where that type of dam-
age is attended by physical injury or there is a physical
impact upon the other."5 Some courts have allowed a
slight impact to be a sufficient basis for recovery.6 Other
courts permit recovery by recognizing the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and the negligent infliction
of emotional distress causes of action.7
Recently, however, a few courts lessened this impact re-
quirement. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, for
example, upheld a passenger's right to sue for intentional
infliction of emotional distress even when no crash oc-
curred. In Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 8 the plane's three
engines failed and the plane experienced an extreme loss
in altitude. The panicked passengers were told to prepare
for a crash landing. Although the plane safely landed and
no impact occurred, the passengers suffered extreme
mental anguish. The court recognized the passengers'
right to sue for the fear that they experienced. 9
Physical manifestation of such mental anguish may also
David L. Farnbauch, Pre-Impact Pain and Suffering Damages in Aviation Accidents,
20 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 252 (1986).
5 38 AM. JUR. 2D, Fright, Shock, and Mental Disturbance § 25 (1968). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
6 See Thomas D. Sydnor II, Damages For a Decedent's Pre-Impact Fear: An Element of
Damages Under Alaska's Survivorship Statute, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 351, 361 (1990). Such
a slight impact could include the lurching of the airliner or a jolt when the brakes
are applied. Id.
7 Id. at 356.
1 872 F.2d 1462 (11 th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). This Eleventh
Circuit decision was reversed by the Supreme Court under a strict application of
the Warsaw Convention.
" Id. at 1480.
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be a requirement for recovery in some states.' 0 Until re-
cently, attorneys avoided pursuit of these additional dam-
ages because of the obstacles to recovery." Serious
evidentiary issues arise in pursuing claims of pre- or post-
impact pain and suffering because most persons involved
in airline accidents do not survive.
B. TYPES OF DAMAGES
Damages in cases resulting from aviation accidents are
based on a variety of theories.' 2 While actual and com-
pensatory damages typically redress loss of earnings and
property loss, damages can also include recovery for
physical injuries. This would include "losses which can
readily be proven to have been sustained, and for which
the injured party should be compensated as a matter of
right."' 3 Pecuniary damages are available for economic
10 The physical manifestation requirement limits recovery to plaintiffs who can
prove that they experienced physical symptoms brought on by emotional distress.
Such symptoms might include high blood pressure, gastric disturbances, weight
loss, or sleeplessness. Farnbauch, supra note 4, at 221 n.16.
1 Abraham Fuchsberg, Damages for Pre-Impact Terror, 16 TRIAL L.Q. 29, 32
(1984). Fuchsberg points out that attorneys face three common problems: "brev-
ity of time, brevity of damages, [and] brevity of proof." Id. Sometimes such a
short amount of time exists before impact that the jury might wonder if the dece-
dent was ever aware of the danger. If there was awareness, it is up to the jury to
decide if such a short time in pain and suffering should be compensable. But, as
Fuchsberg states, "[iut is the intensity of feeling rather than its duration that ex-
plains the size of recovery. It is the compression of fear within a few fleeting
seconds of horror and panic." Id. at 33.
12 See WINDLE TURLEY, AVIATION LITIGATION § 4.06 (1986).
'3 BARRONS LAw DICTIONARY 117 (3d ed. 1991). The Restatement (Second) of Torts
states that " '[c]ompensatory damages' are the damages awarded to a person as
compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained by him." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1977). Comment a is applicable in this
discussion:
When there has been harm only to the pecuniary interests of a per-
son, compensatory damages are designed to place him in a position
substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would
have occupied had no tort been committed. When however, the tort
causes bodily harm or emotional distress, the law cannot restore the in-
jured person to his previous position. The sensations caused by
harm to the body or by pain or humiliation are not in any way analo-
gous to a pecuniary loss, and a sum of money is not equivalent of
peace of mind .... There is no scale by which the detriment caused
by suffering can be measured and hence there can be only a very
408 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [59
loss, including the loss of anticipated financial support.' 4
They are available to accident victims or to those who suf-
fer economic loss from the death of the decedent.' 5
Punitive damages are, by contrast, excess monetary
compensation awarded to the injured in instances of will-
ful misconduct as a punishment to the wrongdoer.'" The
allowance of punitive damages theoretically deters similar
conduct. 17
There are four key goals of punitive damages:
punish[ing] [a] defendant.... deter[ing] similar wrongdo-
ing in the future .... induc[ing] private persons to enforce
the rules of law by rewarding them for bringing malefac-
tors to justice .. .[and] further compensat[ing] plaintiffs
whose actual damages exceed those for which the law al-
lows recovery and whose recovery in any event has likely
been substantially depleted by attorneys fees.' 8
Punitive damages also protect consumers by encouraging
businesses to provide safer products and services. 9 "A
plaintiff who obtains punitive damages both redresses a
societal wrong and imposes a penalty against the defend-
ant. '12 0  Although punitive damages require more than
just negligence, punitive liability may be easier to prove in
aviation litigation due to the tragic nature of airline acci-
rough correspondence between the amount awarded as damages
and the extent of the suffering.
Id. § 903 cmt. a (emphasis added).
14 See also BARRONS LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 347.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 117.
,7 Paulsen, supra note 2, at 809.
18 David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L.
REV. 1257, 1277-78 (1976). Although Owen's analysis is limited to products lia-
bility actions, his justifications for punitive damages are applicable in most in-
stances. He asserts that the punishing aspect of punitive damages "helps restore
the plaintiff's emotional equilibrium" as sort of a private revenge. Id. at 1279.
Punitive damages help channel that retaliation into the courtroom. Id. at 1280.
Punitive damages also can be used as a "reformative device to educate the of-
fender to society's legal values and to allow him to atone for his misdeed through
suffering." Id. at 1281.
,9 Paulsen, supra note 2, at 811-12.
20 Id. at 812 (citing Owen, supra note 18, at 1287-88).
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dents. 2 ' Pre-impact pain and suffering awards may appear
to be punitive in nature, but in fact they are compensating
a type of injury. Yet it is foreseeable that attorneys would
attempt to recover punitive damages based on such emo-
tionally charged evidence.
C. PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MENTAL ANGUISH
There are two distinct types of injuries arising under
pre- and post-impact pain and suffering: physical injuries
and mental anguish.22 Physical injuries may occur before
impact. Passengers might be injured or tossed about in
the cabin as the plane falls from the sky and crashes.
Physical injury may also occur from the crash impact it-
self, likely resulting in massive internal injuries or dis-
memberment. The final type of physical injury may occur
after the impact. A passenger, for example, might survive
the crash but die from burns and smoke inhalation while
trying to escape through the crash debris.2 3 Although this
post-impact, pre-death pain and suffering is compensable
in theory, a problem of proof arises due to the nearly im-
possible task of determining who survived the impact and
who did not.2 4 Forensic experts and coroners who medi-
cally determine the cause of death can heavily impact the
determination of how much pain and suffering the dece-
dent encountered or if death was instantaneous.2 5
Pre- and post-impact pain and suffering can also in-
clude mental anguish. Courts may refer to mental
anguish as pre-impact fright,26 pre-impact fear and ter-
21 Paulsen, supra note 2, at 812.
22 Fuchsberg states that "[plain is to be thought of as the physical pain follow-
ing the impact or the trauma. 'Suffering' is the mental and emotional distress aris-
ing from the pain and the other personal consequences of the trauma."
Fuchsberg, supra note 11, at 31.
23 See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1300 (D. Conn.
1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975).
24 E.g., Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 793 (5th Cir. 1976) (allowing recov-
ery although there was no evidence of any passenger surviving the impact), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
2-5 TURLEY, supra note 12, § 4.06.
216 Nye v. Department of Transp., 480 A.2d 318, 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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ror,27 pre-injury mental anguish, 8 and pre-impact emo-
tional distress.29  Certainly, mental anguish would result
from the impact itself and would also be a part of any
post-impact pain and suffering recovery.30 For example, a
passenger might survive the initial impact but experience
unimaginable horror and fright in the final moments
before death. Mental anguish in apprehension of the im-
pending crash is the most controversial area of recovery.
II. SURVIVAL VERSUS WRONGFUL DEATH
In the past, a common law action for personal injuries
abated when the injured person died. Thus, if a victim
died, his or her estate and family could not recover for
medical and funeral expenses or recover the loss of in-
come that the decedent would have contributed in later
years. However, legislators attempted to alleviate this
problem through wrongful death and survival statutes.3 '
A survival action continues the injured party's claim that
occurred before death, while a wrongful death action cre-
ates a new cause of action for the economic loss that the
estate of the decedent suffers. 2 Courts construing the
Texas Survival Statute state that,
21 In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 507 F. Supp. 21,
22 (N.D. 11. 1980), rev'd on reconsideration, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,215 (N.D. Ill.
1983) [hereinafter Air Crash Chicago].
28 Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Neb. 1989).
29 Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 962 (D. Kan. 1986).
10 This includes the fright occurring during the ordeal and the crash.
31 3 MARILYN K. MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 20.11 (1987). The
ancient common law abatement rule of "actio personalis moritur cum persona"
meant that a personal action dies with the person. See 2 STUART M. SPEISER, RE-
COVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH, § 14.1 n.l (2d ed. 1975 & Supp. 1990). Although
it was first thought to have emerged from Roman jurisprudence, this abatement
rule has now been abandoned. In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines,
Inc. Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on Apr. 2, 1986, 778 F. Supp. 625, 630
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 1043, 1063 (1965)), rev'd sub nom., Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975
F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992). Malone states that "[t]he probable origin of the rule deny-
ing a cause of action for wrongful death was the doctrine, since discarded, that
where a cause of action disclosed the commission of a felony the civil action was
merged into the criminal wrong. The sources of the felony merger doctrine are
lost in the obscurity of Anglo-Saxon law." Malone, supra, at 1055.
32 In re Inflight Explosion, 778 F. Supp. at 629.
[59
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[D]amages which may be recovered under the statute in-
clude consciousness of impending death and physical pain
and suffering, and medical and funeral expenses .... [In a
wrongful death suit beneficiaries may recover] the mone-
tary value of the benefit that the plaintiff reasonably ex-
pected to receive from the decedent had he [lived]. 33
Pre-impact fear has for the most part been an element
of damages in survival actions rather than in actions for
wrongful death because the survival action allows the
cause of action in tort to survive an individual's death.34
Only recently have these damages been recognized at all,
due to the fact that plaintiffs often have to rely on specula-
tive, circumstantial evidence to establish pre- or post-im-
pact pain and suffering.
III. TYPES OF CASES AND DIFFERING THEORIES
Several courts have recognized damages for pre-impact
fear,35 while other courts deny recovery, declaring the al-
ss Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Jones, 664 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1984, no writ); see also TEX. Civ. PR¢c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001
(Vernon 1986).
" See Sydnor, supra note 6, at 354.
35 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 789
F.2d 1092, 1099 (5th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Air Crash New Orleans 1] (allowing
recovery for pre-impact mental pain and suffering, and post-impact pain and suf-
fering but using remittitur to lower jury award), aff'd in relevant part, 821 F.2d 1147
(5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 490 U.S. 1032
(1989); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792 (5th Cir. 1976) (allowing recovery
for conscious pain and suffering prior to death although apprehension of death
could only be presumed), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Brun-Jacobo v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 847 F.2d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1988) (reinstating original
verdict of $20,000 for pre-impact mental anguish after second jury's award of
$25,000 was reversed by court); In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La. on
July 9, 1982, 795 F.2d 1230, 1237 (5th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Air Crash New Orle-
ans II] (holding there was sufficient evidence of pre-impact pain and suffering to
raise ajury question, but for retrial set the maximum recovery at $7500 per parent
and $5000 per child); Pregeant v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 762 F.2d 1245,
1249 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that evidence was sufficient to establish pre-impact
mental suffering and post-impact pain and suffering before death); Haley v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Louisiana
law, court permitted recovery for decedents pre-impact fear, even without eye-
witness testimony); Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 49
(2d Cir. 1984) (upholding jury's award for pre-impact pain and suffering); Mala-
cynski v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 565 F. Supp. 105, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stat-
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leged damages too speculative.36 Some courts restrict re-
covery to injuries resulting in, or from a physical impact. 7
Recently, courts have adopted differing theories that
support the basis of pre-impact fear recoveries. Surpris-
ingly, these theories are quite similar in their underlying
rationale. Some courts refuse to separate the ordeal into
pre-injury and post-injury, focusing instead on the tor-
tious physical injury involved. 8 Other courts recognize
the panic and stress of pre-impact fear as negligently in-
ing New York law does allow a claim for pre-impact pain and suffering as well as
post-impact pain and suffering); Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981,
1015 (D. Haw. 1965) (awarding for pain and suffering "during the descent of the
Piper plane, its crash to the ground, and the burning of the decedent to death."),
aff'd, 381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967); Blum v. Airport Terminal Serv., 762 S.W.2d
67, 76 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding jury award in part because decedent sus-
tained severe pain and suffering during conscious moments both prior to and im-
mediately following the crash); Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25, 31 (Neb. 1989)
(allowing recovery for conscious pre-fatal injury, fear, and apprehension of im-
pending death); Hurst Aviation v. Junell, 642 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1982, no writ) (finding evidence sufficient to establish decedent suffered
mental anguish because he was conscious of approaching death).
16 See, e.g., Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, 828 F.2d 278, 288 n.43 (5th
Cir. 1987) (upholding district court's denial of damages for decedents' pre-crash
conscious pain and suffering because occupants of plane were killed instantly, and
because there was no evidence of what happened inside the plane before its
crash); Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding it would there was no evidence that decedent suffered conscious pain
and suffering prior to impact); Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 745,
766 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (finding insufficient evidence to support an award for pre-
impact mental anguish), modified on other grounds, 897 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1990);
Larsen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 714, 721 (S.D. Tex. 1988) (finding
conflicting testimony too speculative to award damages for any pre-impact suffer-
ing that the decedent may have experienced); Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
382 F. Supp. 1271, 1301 (D. Conn. 1974) (holding that it would be too speculative
to award damages for conscious pain and suffering in contemplation of death),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975).
57 See, e.g., Fogerty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953 (D. Kan.
1986) (denying negligently induced, pre-impact emotional distress not itself re-
sulting in physical injury); Air Crash Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21, 24 (N.D. 11. 1980)
(district court first refusing to allow recovery for fright and terror in anticipation
of physical injury), revd on reconsideration, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,215 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (district court on reconsideration allowing recovery if the plaintiffs can
show resulting physical injury from the mental anguish).
58 Sydnor, supra note 6, at 356 n.12; see, e.g., Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 1984); Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir.
1976); Platt v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 554 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1983);
Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1989).
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flicted emotional distress that exists regardless of a physi-
cal injury. 39 Both theories recognize the inevitable
anguish involved in an airline crash, but the latter theory
leads to larger recoveries even in the face of minimal
physical harm to the plaintiff.
A. ELEMENTS AND REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY FOR
RECOVERY
Under a tortious physical ordeal theory, as discussed
previously, some courts establish arbitrary elements nec-
essary to allow recovery for pre- or post-impact pain and
suffering. Courts generally require a physical injury, or in
the case of mental anguish, a physical manifestation of
that injury before a plaintiff can recover for pre-impact in-
juries. Courts also might require proof of consciousness
after impact for any post-impact damages.
1. Impact Rule and Physical Manifestation Requirement
The impact rule and physical manifestation require-
ment are common devices used to limit damages for pre-
impact fear. For example, Illinois courts used to require a
contemporaneous bodily injury in claims for pre-impact
anguish. In Air Crash Chicago40 the court denied the plain-
tiffs' recovery and held that emotional distress recovery is
allowed only "when the distress is caused by a physical in-
jury" not "in anticipation of physical injury."' Three years
later the Illinois Supreme Court abandoned this impact
rule and adopted a zone-of-danger rationale.4 2 This zone-
39 Sydnor, supra note 6, at 356. The impact rule (requiring impact on the plain-
tiff) and the physical manifestation rule (requiring that distress must result in
some physical symptom or injury) are common restrictions placed on the use of a
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988)
(discussing recovery for mental disturbances).
40 507 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Il. 1980).
4, Id. at 23 (emphasis added). On reconsideration, the court held that the
plaintiffs could recover for pre-impact distress if they could show "resultant physi-
cal manifestation" of the distress. Air Crash Chicago, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,215,
at 17,217 (N.D. Il. 1983).
42 Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (Il1. 1983).
19931 413
414 JOURNAL OF AIR LI WAND COMMERCE [59
of-danger rule requires that the party show some sort of
physical injury as a result of the emotional distress.
Courts applying the impact rule usually follow the ra-
tionale in 436A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.43 Com-
ment B states the policies for such a rule:
One is that emotional disturbance which is not so severe
and serious as to have physical consequences is normally
in the realm of the trivial, and so falls within the maxim
that the law does not concern itself with trifles. It is likely
to be so temporary, so evanescent, and so relatively harm-
less and unimportant, that the task of compensating for it
would unduly burden the courts and the defendants. The
second is that in the absence of the guarantee of genuine-
ness provided by resulting bodily harm such emotional
disturbance may be too easily feigned, depending, as it
must, very largely upon the subjective testimony of the
plaintiff; and that to allow recovery for it might open too
wide a door for false claimants who have suffered no real
harm at all. The third is that where the defendant has
been merely negligent, without any element of intent to
do harm, his fault is not so great that he should be re-
43 See, e.g., Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 957-58 (D.
Kan. 1986). Section 436(A) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of
causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and
it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm
or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emo-
tional disturbance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965).
Prosser and Keeton also outline some of the objections to recovery for mental
disturbance: "that mental disturbance cannot be measured in terms of money,
and so cannot serve in itself as a basis for the action; that its physical conse-
quences are too remote, and so not 'proximately caused'; that there is a lack of
precedent; and that a vast increase in litigation would follow." KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 39, at 360. These objections have been discredited by recent commen-
tators and courts. But Prosser and Keeton still have three remaining vital
concerns:
(1) the problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is often
temporary and relatively trivial; (2) the danger that claims of mental
harm will be falsified or imagined; and (3) the perceived unfairness
of imposing heavy and disproportionate financial burdens upon a
defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for consequences
which appear remote from the wrongful act.
Id. at 360-61.
MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
quired to make good a purely mental disturbance.44
This impact rule dominated the twentieth century cases,
apparently because of concern over an increase in bur-
densome litigation, a fear of fraudulent claims,45 a general
suspicion of damages for emotional distress, and "a con-
viction that one had to bear the psychological hard knocks
in life."' 46 Courts that also require a physical manifesta-
tion of the emotional distress follow this same line of
reasoning.
Some courts, however, reject this rationale. The court
in Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Express, Inc. 47 believed that such a
rule seemed "illogical and unenlightened" when there is a
genuinely distressed plaintiff.48  Advances in diagnostic
techniques, which can accurately measure emotional dis-
tress even when there is no physical injury, eliminate the
danger of fraudulent claims. 49  "[M]ental suffering is
scarcely more difficult of proof [sic], and certainly no
harder to estimate in terms of money, than the physical
pain of a broken leg, which never has been denied
compensation." 50
The counter arguments against the imposition of such
rules are very persuasive. The attempt to eliminate fraud-
ulent claims by imposing an impact requirement may have
been necessary before medical science could adequately
recognize emotional distress. 5' Today, however, emo-
44 RESTATEMENT, supra note 43, § 436A cmt. b.
45 Kathleen M. Turezyn, When Circumstances Provide a Guarantee of Genuineness: Per-
mitting Recovery for Pre-Impact Emotional Distress, 28 B.C. L. REv. 881, 931 (1987).
46 Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal Change,
23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 29 (1988).
41 640 F. Supp. 953 (D. Kan. 1986).
4, Id. at 963.
19 Id. Although the federal court in Fogarty disapproved of the anachronistic
impact rule, it was forced to follow the rule until formally discarded by the Kansas
Supreme Court.
50 KEETON ET AL., supra note 39, at 55.
-1 Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 962. The court succinctly stated:
Today, it is not at all clear that a physical impact is more likely to
result in genuine emotional distress than are many non-impact situa-
tions. For instance, the fear of a fatal collision seems far more likely
to create intense emotional distress than is a merely incidental physi-
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tional damages are quantifiable and commonly recog-
nized by medical doctors. Additionally, denying a valid
claim merely to avoid burdensome litigation has been dis-
credited.52 Finally, requiring plaintiffs to prove resulting
physical injury from emotional distress can lead to injus-
tice if proof is unavailable, or can lead to creative fact
finding by plaintiffs' attorneys zealously trying to manu-
facture such proof.53 Therefore, the impact rule might be
considered outdated and ineffective as a means of dis-
couraging litigious behavior.
2. Proof of Consciousness
Another device courts use to limit post-impact awards is
"proof of consciousness." Many courts require proof of
consciousness of the decedent prior to death in order to
award post-impact damages for physical injuries, and any
post-impact mental anguish. For example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Pregeant v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc.,"' required proof that the decedent was
conscious, however briefly, following the injury to allow
post-impact pain and suffering. 55 The decedent, a former
flight attendant, assumed a "brace" position as the plane
fell from the sky. 56 The other 144 decedents died primar-
ily from dismemberment and impact injuries. The plain-
tiff, on the other hand, was not dismembered but instead
had third-degree burns over ninety-five percent of her
body. Based on the evidence, the court held that a rea-
cal contact. The effect of the rule, however, is to bar a truly dis-
tressed (but non-impacted) plaintiff from attempting to convince a
jury that his complaints are genuine.
Id.
I2 Turezyn, supra note 45, at 931.
-3 Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 962. Also, some commentators point out that serious
physical injuries are unlikely to result from a short-term emotional experience
(even those of a violent nature) "except where there is a predisposition to such a
result." Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or Its Physical Conse-
quences in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R. 2D 100, 105
(1959).





sonable jury could have inferred she was conscious after
impact, and therefore allowed recovery to her estate for
the extreme pain that she suffered. 7
B. JUDICIAL TECHNIQUES LESSENING STRICT
REQUIREMENTS
While most courts require a physical impact or a physi-
cal manifestation of mental anguish, other courts use a va-
riety of techniques to circumvent the impact rule and
proof of consciousness requirement. In an early leading
case, Solomon v. Warren,58 the Fifth Circuit extended the
time frame surrounding injury to include the inevitable
physical injury of death and the mental anguish in antici-
pation of impact. 59 The court, applying Florida law,
stated that "the plaintiff must prove that the deceased was
conscious between the time of injury and the time of
death, so that he actually felt and appreciated the pain re-
sulting from the injuries."6 The decedents were aboard a
private plane. After running low on fuel, the pilot radioed
the Barbados tower stating that the fuel gauges were read-
ing low and that he would attempt to ditch the plane near
a merchant vessel. Neither the plane nor its passengers
were ever recovered. Although no evidence showed the
decedents survived impact, the court found that they were
probably aware of their impending death from the time of
the radio transmission and thus were certain to have "ex-
perienced the most excruciating type of pain and suffer-
ing. The court reasoned that although the usual
sequence is impact followed by pain and suffering, there is
51 Id. Although her consciousness was not conclusively established, the possi-
bility that she could have experienced such pain after impact must have swayed the
court in allowing post-impact recovery.
so 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
59 Id.; see also Carol Tener, Recovery Allowed for Pain and Suffering Experienced by
Decedent Prior to Impact, 4 W. ST. L. REV. 301 (1977); Farnbauch, supra note 4, at
231.
60 Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792.
61 Id. Dissenting Judge Gee argued strongly against allowing pre-impact dam-
ages in this case because he viewed them as uncertain and immeasurable. Id. at
797 (Gee, J., dissenting).
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no logical reason to reject a claim just because the se-
quence was reversed.6 2  This same argument was ad-
vanced by the plaintiff in Air Crash Chicago,63 but to no
avail.
IV. DEGREE OF EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR
RECOVERY
Many courts refuse to award pre- or post-impact dam-
ages because of lack of proof. "A damages award cannot
stand when the only evidence to support it is speculative
or purely conjectural."' 4 This issue arises in most avia-
62 Id. at 793. But cf In re Eastern Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Air-
port on May 5, 1983, 629 F. Supp. 307, 310 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (applying Florida law,
the court stated that "[a]bsent allegations of impact and/or direct physical contact
resulting from defendant's alleged negligence, this Court concludes that there
can be no recovery for emotional distress caused by simple negligence, unless
Plaintiffs can establish discernible physical consequences resulting from the dis-
tress"), overruled by, Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11 th Cir. 1989)
rev'd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit held that because
passengers did experience fright and terror after all three engines failed, the plain-
tiffs had stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
under state law. Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1467. The court also held that the Warsaw
Convention allows recovery for "purely emotional injuries unaccompanied by
physical injury." Id. at 1471. The circuit decision upheld the Florida appellate
court decision in King v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 536 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987), but acknowledged that the Florida Supreme Court was yet to hear the
issue, and thus the state cause of action would be subject to a later decision. Fi-
nally the Florida Supreme Court, focusing on the intent aspect, decided that the
plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress under state law. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla.
1990).
The court did agree that there was a claim for emotional distress under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention. Id. at 578. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention did not al-
low recovery for mental injury when unaccompanied by physical injury. Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991). The court focused on the term "le-
sion corporelle" in the original French text of the Warsaw Convention and took it
to mean "bodily injury." Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1491. They held that a narrow read-
ing of the Warsaw Convention was a product of the original intent of the drafters
who wanted to limit the liability of fledgling airlines and who never considered
liability for purely psychic injury. Id. at 1498-99.
63 507 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Ill. 1980). In this case the plaintiff tried to convince
the court to extend the time frame to include the period "immediately prior to
inevitable injury." Id. at 23. The court, however, rejected this analysis presumably
on the basis of strict adherence to the impact rule. Id. at 24.(4 Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 746 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1984).
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tion cases, creating a considerable amount of case law.
One of the earliest aviation cases to discuss conscious
pain and suffering in contemplation of death was Feldman
v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.65 In this case, the surviving hus-
band brought a wrongful death action on behalf of his
wife who was killed in an airplane crash. At trial, the
plaintiff submitted the National Transportation Safety
Board report that indicated that a fire began upon impact
and totally destroyed both the upper portion of the fuse-
lage and the cabin area of the airplane.66 The report
noted that the crash was survivable because "the fuselage
structure remained sufficiently intact to preclude the in-
fliction of traumatic injuries to the occupants. '67 Over
one half of the deceased passengers were found near a
rear door that could not be opened without a stewardess
or without the passengers being able to read detailed in-
structions. All of the passengers, except the two survi-
vors, died of smoke inhalation or burns. One survivor
testified that he anticipated the crash when, upon looking
out the window, he noticed that the plane was at an un-
usually low altitude.68
The court analyzed all of this testimony yet found that
the evidence failed "to show the existence of any nexus
between the evidence that many of the passengers re-
mained conscious after impact and the crucial question
whether the decedent was likewise conscious after im-
pact."' 69 The evidence failed to satisfy the proof of con-
sciousness requirement, especially since there was no
evidence showing where the decedent's body was found.70
Similarly, the evidence proved no dramatic change in alti-
65 382 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 524 F.2d 384
(2d Cir. 1975).
66 Id. at 1300 n.38.
67 Id. at 1300 n.39.
6 This passenger was one of the two survivors who avoided the rear door and
instead climbed out over the left wing.
69 Id. at 1300.
70 Id. The court's analysis seems to hold that if the plaintiff had been found in
her seat, the evidence would lean towards unconsciousness after impact. Con-
versely, if she had been found near the rear door with the other decedents, there
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tude occurred during the plane's descent. 7' The court
found the evidence too speculative to prove that Mrs.
Feldman was cognizant of the impending danger, and
thus did not allow damages for conscious pain and suffer-
ing before death.72 It seems clear that if the plaintiff had
proven that Mrs. Feldman survived the impact long
enough to struggle towards the rear emergency door, the
court would have likely awarded damages for her panic
stricken moments inside a burning airplane.
In a unique factual situation, the Fifth Circuit reversed
an award of $100,000 for pre-death pain and suffering in
In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9,
1982. 73 The Pan American plane crashed into Mrs. Gian-
contieri's house, killing her and her three children who
were also inside. Although the evidence proved that Mrs.
Giancontieri's body was found in a crawling position and
that she died from third degree burns over 100 percent of
her body, the court found that there was no evidence of
her consciousness after the plane crashed into her
house. 4 The court stated, "[t]here is simply no direct or
circumstantial evidence from which it could be inferred
that Mrs. Giancontieri felt anything between the impact of
the plane and her death."' 75 The court went to great
lengths to distinguish this case from Pregeant v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, Inc.,76 a similar case arising out of the
same air crash, which relied on the fact that the decedent
on board the plane had braced herself thus raising an "in-
ference of continued consciousness. ' 7 7 It seems that the
would be a stronger inference that she retained consciousness after the impact.
Id.
7 Id. at 1301.
72 Id.
73 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Air Crash New Orleans III].
74 Id. at 1157.
75 Id.
76 762 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1985).
77 Air Crash New Orleans 111, 767 F.2d at 1157 n.9. Concerning pre-impact
mental suffering, the Pregeant court found that there was a basis for finding that
the decedent suffered for at least part of the last twenty seconds of the flight as the
plane struck a tree and rolled. Pregeant, 762 F.2d at 1249.
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court in Air Crash New Orleans III was basing its analysis of
the evidence on a merciful belief in instantaneous death
rather than having to acknowledge Ms. Giacontieri's
unimaginable pain and mental anguish.
Courts are reluctant to allow damages for pre-death
pain and suffering or mental anguish in the face of cir-
cumstantial or speculative evidence. In Douglass v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc.78 the district court stated that although
mental anguish prior to impact is recoverable by the es-
tate of the deceased, it must be more than speculative or
purely conjectural. 79 The court recognized that eyewit-
ness testimony is not necessary "because no one will ever
know what was going through the mind of the decedent
before the crash." 80 Even though it did not expand on its
reasoning, the court concluded: "[t]here is simply not
enough evidence that the passengers seated in the front
of the aircraft experienced the same fears as those in the
rear, or that Mr. Douglass' feelings were more like the
frightened survivors than the unfazed survivors.""'
Apparently, the court in Douglass relied on the ruling in
another case arising out of the same crash. In Larsen v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.8 2 the wife of a deceased passenger
killed in the L- 1011 crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Interna-
tional Airport brought a wrongful death action against the
airline. The district court found conflicting testimony too
speculative to award damages. Two crash survivors testi-
fied they experienced "trepidation" as the plane de-
scended and made contact with the ground, while two
other survivors testified that the plane's approach was
consistent with landings in stormy weather and that the
plane's initial contact with the ground was rough, but did
not concern them.83 The court stated that because of this
78 709 F. Supp. 745 (W.D. Tex. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 897 F.2d
1336 (5th Cir. 1990).
79 id. at 765.
8o Id. at 765-66.
81 Id. at 766.
82 692 F. Supp. 714 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
,s Id. at 721.
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conflicting testimony and the lack of testimony concern-
ing what the decedent experienced, it could not award
damages for pre-impact pain and suffering. 4 The court
conceded that Texas recognizes recoveries for pre-impact
mental anguish, but refused to award damages when the
evidence was questionable and speculative.
In contravention of the foregoing cases is the bench-
mark case of Haley v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.8 5
where the court upheld a $15,000 award for pre-impact
fear. The only evidence offered was a videotape simula-
tion of the takeoff and crash together with an expert wit-
ness who explained that the plane's wing struck a tree
fifty-three feet above ground and then rolled, impacted,
and disintegrated four to six seconds later. The plaintiff's
expert expressed the opinion that "most of the people
[aboard Flight 759], if not all, would be in absolute state
of pandemonium, panic and extreme state of stress,"
probably from the beginning of the descent and roll, but
definitely from the time the wing struck the tree." Even
the defendant's expert conceded that when the passen-
gers experienced a "violent change in the plane, the last
couple of seconds," they "certainly would have been
thrown about and fightingfor their lives and experienced a
whole different situation. '8 7 The court analyzed Louisi-
ana law and found no cases that had previously con-
fronted whether pre-impact fear prior to death and prior
to physical impact was legally compensable. It did hold,
however, that Louisiana allowed recovery during a negli-
gently produced ordeal and believed that Louisiana
courts would probably not sever such an ordeal before
and after impact.8 8 Looking to the Solomon precedent, the
84 Id.; see also George S. Petkoff, Recent Cases and Developments in Airlaw Part 11, 56
J. AIR L. & CoM. 491 (1990) (discussing the rationale in the Larsen case).
'5 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984).
86 Id. at 316.
87 Id.
" Id. at 314.
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Haley court recognized such a cause of action.8 9 The court
acknowledged that no one will truly ever know what the
decedent understood before his death, "[t]he inference is
more than 'reasonable', however, that [the decedent] ap-
prehended his death at least from the time the plane's
wing hit the tree." 90 Concededly, the evidence in Haley
was speculative, but the court refused to find the jury
award too "shocking" in the face of such a horrible disas-
ter. By affirming this award for pre-death mental anguish,
the Haley court paved the way for acceptance of these
types of damages based on somewhat conjectural evi-
dence. Other courts have followed the humanistic and
sympathetic reasoning underlying the Haley analysis and
allowed pre-impact recovery, but only when remittitur is
an added option to reduce extremely high recoveries.
Some commentators support the award of speculative
pre-impact damages, such as those awarded in Haley, as
long as the practice of remittitur can be used.9 Remitti-
tur is the process by which a court compels a plaintiff to
choose between reduction of an excess verdict or a new
trial.92 On its face, remittitur looks to be favorable to
those plaintiffs whose mental anguish claims a court might
strike as too speculative. The opposite argument can be
made, however, that remittitur is inappropriately used to
lower jury awards that accurately compensate truly in-
jured victims. 93
V. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES IN PRE-IMPACT CASES
As the air disaster near Chicago O'Hare International
"9 Id. (citing Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 801 (1977)).
9o Id. at 317.
91 See generally 6A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
59.08[7] (2d ed. 1985) (stating "but while the conjectural nature of pre-impact
pain and suffering is a valid argument supporting remittitur of such damages,
there is little justification for courts to presume that any claim for pre-impact dam-
ages is per se too speculative").
92 See Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1984).
9,1 Remittitur is often used by the Fifth Circuit and will be discussed later in
more detail.
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Airport demonstrated, the same crash can result in very
different results turning on an evidentiary issue. In fact,
most of the existing case law concerning pre- and post-
impact mental anguish has arisen out of only a few airline
accidents.9 4 Courts have not consistently applied rules of
evidence in cases arising out of the same airline crash.
The most interesting manifestation of inconsistent results
arose out of the DC-10 crash at Chicago O'Hare on May
25, 1979.
In Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.905 the Second Cir-
cuit denied recovery, apparently basing its ruling on the
fact that when the plane lost an engine on its left side, Mr.
Shatkin was seated on the right side of the plane, unable
to see the engine. 96 Additionally, some evidence showed
that the plane was not in obvious difficulty until a very
short time before impact and that no one alerted Mr.
Shatkin to the danger. Plaintiffs offered no proof that Mr.
Shatkin experienced conscious pain and suffering. The
court acknowledged that eyewitness testimony would be
impossible to obtain and thus not essential for recovery.97
The court, however, required at least some circumstantial
evidence from which a reasonable inference could be
made that the passenger underwent some pre-impact suf-
fering.98 Failing to find any such evidence in Mr.
Shatkin's case, the court reversed the $87,500 award for
conscious pain and suffering experienced prior to death. 99
In direct opposition to the Shatkin holding is Shu-Tao
Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 100 The Lin court concluded
that New York law permits recovery for a decedent's pre-
impact fear and found "no intrinsic or logical barrier to
- Most case law has arisen from the American Airlines crash at Chicago
O'Hare, the Pan Am disaster near New Orleans, Louisiana, and the Delta crash at
Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.




- Id. at 204.
0 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Winstol D. Carter, Jr., Recent Developments
in Aviation Case Law, 51 J. AIR L. & CoM. 51, 115 (1985).
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recovery for the fear experienced during a period in
which the decedent is uninjured but aware of impending
death." ° The court distinguished Shatkin, apparently on
the basis that Dr. Lin had been assigned a seat over the
left wing, in view of the left engine, and thus was able to
see a portion of the wing fall off at the beginning of the
flight. 0 2 He might have seen the engine fall off, but there
was no direct evidence that he witnessed it.
It is amazing that the same federal court could come to
such differing conclusions in these two cases ostensibly
because of where the decedent was seated. This under-
scores the suspicion and hesitancy with which courts view
evidence of pre-impact mental anguish.
VI. SURVEY OF STATES THAT HAVE ADDRESSED
THE ISSUE OF PRE- AND POST-IMPACT
PAIN AND SUFFERING AND
MENTAL ANGUISH
Not only have federal courts disagreed on the issues
surrounding pre- and post-impact pain and suffering or
mental anguish, but many state courts have struggled with
these issues. As a result, a variety of theories have been
adopted. The following section outlines several jurisdic-
tions that have dealt with these issues in a handful of rele-
vant cases.
A. ILLINOIS
In Illinois, a plaintiff can bring a survival action for con-
1o Shu-Tao Lin, 742 F.2d at 53. The district court gave a more expansive analy-
sis stating:
New York provides a cause of action for the pain and suffering of a
decedent before his death. In several cases it has been held that a
decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's pain and suffering
endured after the injury that led to his death.... From this proposi-
tion it is only a short step to the allowing of damages for a dece-
dent's pain and suffering before the mortal blow and resulting from
the apprehension of impending death.
Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1407, 1416 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 742 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1984).
02 Shu-Tao Lin, 742 F.2d at 53.
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scious pain and suffering in addition to an action for
wrongful death.'0 3 But, as previously discussed, Illinois
courts have limited recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress to instances when the distress results in
physical injury. 0 4 The court in Harrison v. Burlington Rail-
road'0 5 found that conjectural evidence of post-impact
damage was not sufficient as proof of this type of damage.
Indeed, "where the death is instantaneous or where the
decedent is rendered immediately unconscious, an action
for pain and suffering cannot be sustained."'
0 6
B. PENNSYLVANIA
Following Illinois's reasoning, Pennsylvania established
tough requirements for recovery of pre-impact mental
anguish. Pennsylvania denies recovery for pre-impact
emotional distress unless such distress results in physical
injury; an evidentiary obstacle that is almost impossible to
surmount. In Nye v. Pennsylvania Department of Transporta-
tion ' 07 a father brought a wrongful death action against
the driver of the vehicle that ran his daughter's car off the
road. The court dismissed the claim for the decedent's
pre-impact fright despite testimony that after being forced
off the road, the decedent driver struggled to bring her
car under control before the fatal crash. The court held
that "the estate may recover damages for 'pre impact
fright' only upon proof that [the decedent] suffered physi-
cal harm prior to the impact as a result of her fear of impend-
ing death."'' 0
C. KANSAS
Kansas probably would not recognize recovery for pre-
impact mental anguish either. Although Fogarty v. Camp-
10- Air Crash Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
- Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1 (11. 1983).
105 750 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. 11. 1990).
Id. at 318.
107 480 A.2d 318 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
I, Id. at 322.
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bell 66 Express, Inc. 109 did not involve an airplane crash, the
district court analyzed many of the precedents involving
airplane accidents. The district court predicted that the
Kansas Supreme Court would follow Illinois"10 and Penn-
sylvania in denying recovery for pre-impact emotional dis-
tress not resulting in bodily harm.' The court, however,
advocated the abolition of this rule and stressed that the
Kansas Supreme Court should follow the more prevalent
federal precedents. 12
Concerning post-impact emotional distress, the court
stated that "[u]nder Kansas law, 'pain and suffering must
be realized by the injured party before it is compensa-
ble.' 111l3 Yet it declined to allow a summary judgment on
that claim because the court was not convinced that the
decedent died immediately.' '4 The court's finding of con-
sciousness contradicted the death certificate, which stated
that the decedent had died immediately.' 15 Arguably, the
district court stretched its analysis to allow post-impact
damages because it determined that the decedent's estate
was owed compensation. Since pre-impact damages were
unavailable, the court's only option was to allow post-im-
pact damages.
D. MISSOURI
In opposition to the previous three states, Missouri
courts have determined that Missouri statutorily allows
compensation for pain and suffering experienced by the
decedent prior to his death." 6 In Blum v. Airport Terminal
-0 640 F. Supp. 953 (D. Kan. 1986).
110 See Air Crash Chicago, 507 F. Supp. 21, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
- Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 957. The court's analysis is seemingly predicated
upon § 436A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
112 Id. at 957, 962.
13 Id. at 963 (quoting Nichols v. Marshall, 486 F.2d 791, 793 (10th Cir. 1973)).
114 Fogarty, 640 F. Supp. at 964.
115 The court held that the decedent had possibly survived a first collision be-
tween two trucks and died later when his truck went through a concrete wall. Id.
Thus, the decedent experienced conscious pain and suffering until his death.
16 The Missouri wrongful death revised statute section 537.090 provides that
in addition to specified damages "[t]he mitigating or aggravating circumstances
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Services, Inc. 117 a copilot was killed in an airplane crash,
and his parents sued on his behalf. The copilot was semi-
conscious at the scene of the crash but lapsed into a coma
and died three days later. Looking at his substantial inju-
ries, the court believed that he sustained "severe pain and
suffering during his conscious moments.""'  The court
also focused on the fact that as an experienced pilot, he
was probably uniquely aware of the impending crash." 9
Taken together, these facts evidenced aggravating cir-
cumstances. Thus, the court recognized pre-impact
mental anguish. The court, however, conditioned post-
impact pain and suffering on proof of the continued con-
sciousness of the decedent.
E. MICHIGAN
Michigan common law allows recovery for anxiety, sus-
pense, fright, and mental suffering. 20 In Platt v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. the court refused to grant a summary
judgment dismissing a claim for post-impact conscious
pain and suffering and pre-impact fright and terror.'12
Apparently, the court relied on the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board Report stating that the "passengers
'suffered pain while in the air, and before the plane finally
smashed them to the ground they were shocked, fright-
ened, held in suspense; and otherwise subjected to mental
and physical pain as the airplane inverted, rolled and
plunged.' 122 Although the court acknowledged that
"plaintiffs [might] have a difficult time sustaining their
burden of proof on this issue," it thought that summary
judgment for the defendants would be improper. 123
attending the death may be considered by the trier of facts .. " Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.090 (Vernon 1988).
117 762 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
11 Id. at 76.
1'9 Id.
120 See Platt v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 554 F. Supp. 360, 363 (E.D. Mich.
1983) (citing Sherwood v. Railroad Co., 46 N.W. 773 (Mich. 1890)).
121 Id. at 363.
"22 Id. at 362-63.
1" Id. at 363.
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F. FLORIDA
Florida requires proof of consciousness between time
of injury and time of death as a prerequisite to recovery,
and requires pain to be conclusively shown. 24 While
Florida still clings to the impact rule, Solomon v. Warren '
25
was a unique case that side-stepped this requirement.
The court reversed the usual sequence of impact followed
by pain and suffering and allowed damages for the pain
and suffering before an impact. 26 Although the appellate
court stated the decision complied with the requirements
under the Florida survival statute and the impact doctrine,
no proof of suffering was ever shown.127 "Therefore, Solo-
mon stands for the theory that in cases involving an actual
impact, it is reasonable to offer the plaintiff or his repre-
sentatives an opportunity to prove that he experienced
pain and suffering prior to impact and to allow recovery
for proof of such injury." 128 Such a theory avoids the
problems that arise in cases of instantaneous death.
Clearly, however, Solomon is a unique case, and the rest of
the Florida jurisprudence relies on the impact doctrine.
G. NEBRASKA
Although Nelson v. Dolan' 29 arose out of a motorcycle
and automobile crash, the Nebraska Supreme Court used
this case to review pre-impact mental pain and suffering in
a lengthy discussion focusing on many cases involving air-
plane crashes. 30 The court held:
Nonetheless, we are persuaded that there exists no sound
legal or logical distinction between permitting a dece-
dent's estate to recover as an element of damages for a
decedent's conscious post-injury pain and suffering and
mental anguish and permitting such an estate to recover
124 Tener, supra note 59, at 301.
125 540 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1978).
126 Id. at 793.
127 Tener, supra note 59, at 310.
128 Id.
129 434 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1989).
210 Id. at 30-32.
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for the conscious pre-fatal injury mental anguish resulting
from the apprehension and fear of impending death.'
Nebraska law does not allow pre-impact mental anguish
damages in a wrongful death action, but does allow the
decedent's estate, in a survival claim, to pursue such dam-
ages.1 3 2 In Nelson, although there was no evidence that
the decedent said anything during the impact and crash,
the court held that he should be compensated for the five
seconds that he was aware of his impending death. 3
H. NEW YORK
New York is a leading jurisdiction on causes of action
for mental injuries. Federal courts have attempted to de-
fine existing New York state law. In applying New York
law, the federal district court in Malacynski v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. 134 denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's claim for conscious pain and suffering and
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 135 Mala-
cynski brought this action after his wife died aboard a DC-
10 that crashed at Chicago-O'Hare Airport. Relying on
Anderson v. Rowe,' 36 the court held that a claim was proper
where the plaintiff can produce evidence from which a
jury could infer that the decedent was aware of the danger
and suffered from pre-impact terror. 3 7 The Malacynski
court adopted the view that pre-impact damages were re-
coverable based on two settled principles of New York
law:
First, the New York Court of Appeals has held that a plain-
1 Id. at 31.
132 Id. at 28-29.
13s Id. at 32. This speculative time period was determined by an accident recon-
structionist, but there was no conclusive proof that the decedent actually suffered
for that amount of time. Id.
is, 565 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
135 Id. at 106.
136 425 N.Y.S.2d 180 (App. Div. 1980).
137 Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 106. The court in Fogarty v. Campbell 66 Ex-
press, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 953, 959 (D. Kan. 1986), dismissed this wrongly placed
reliance on the Anderson dicta because, in the court's view, the dicta only "implies
that recovery would be allowed if the proper evidence were available." Id.
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tiff may recover damages for mental trauma induced by
fear for one's physical well-being, regardless of whether
physical injuries actually were incurred .... Second, New
York State courts clearly allow claims for post-impact pain
and suffering in a wrongful death action where the plaintiff
can establish that the decedent actually regained con-
sciousness after the impact.' 38
The court established that the pre-impact claim did not
merge into the wrongful death claim. Therefore, the
plaintiff could pursue both the pre-impact and post-im-
pact conscious pain and suffering claims. 139
The Second Circuit in Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. 140 followed the Anderson analysis and allowed recov-
ery for a decedent's pre-impact fear. Subsequently, in
O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., t41 the Second Circuit
again applied New York law concerning the relevancy of
evidence concerning pre-impact pain and suffering. 142
The court agreed that testimony of a passenger sitting ten
to fifteen feet behind the decedent was too speculative to
be admissible because the survivor did not see the dece-
dent or know what happened to him.' 43 The exclusion of
such evidence may be due more to the fact that such a
question of relevancy is left to the trial judge's discretion
and would only be overturned if a clear abuse of such dis-
cretion was found. 44 Thus, New York allows such evi-
dence of pre-impact mental anguish, but New York
federal courts disallow purely speculative testimony.
m Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 106 (citation omitted); see Battalla v. New York,
176 N.E.2d 729, 733 (N.Y. 1961).
139 Malacynski, 565 F. Supp. at 106.
140 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984). New York courts have set up criteria to use in
judging a claim of this kind. "In determining damages for conscious pain and
suffering experienced in the interval between injury and death, when the interval
is relatively short, the degree of consciousness, severity of pain, apprehension of
impending death along with duration are all elements to be considered." Juiditta
v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 428 N.Y.S.2d 535, 543 (App. Div. 1980).
14, 730 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1984).
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I. CALIFORNIA
In 1967, an interesting case in California arose that
demonstrates the great lengths courts will go in trying to
satisfy a physical injury requirement. 4 5 The plaintiffs al-
leged "great grievous mental suffering, anguish and anxi-
ety and suffered severe shock to [their] nerves and
nervous system" when they were negligently led to be-
lieve that their plane was about to crash.' 46 The court
found that a nervous "shock" was distinct from mental
anguish and thus a physical injury. 147 In a rather strange
analysis, the court concluded: "[sluch a result must be re-
garded as an injury to the body rather than to the mind,
even though the mind be at the same time injuriously af-
fected.' 48 Recently, the court in In re Air Crash Disaster at
Sioux City, Iowa on July 19, 1989 14 pointed out that in Cali-
fornia, damages for pre-death pain and suffering of a de-
ceased are not available under section 573 of the
California Probate Code, which provides for punitive
damages in some instances, but are recoverable under the
California wrongful death statute.'5 0
J. LOUIsIANA
Although no Louisiana state court has addressed the is-
sue, the Fifth Circuit, in Haley v. Pan American World Air-
ways, Inc., ' concluded that Louisiana would recognize a
cause of action for pre-impact fear experienced by a dece-
dent because Louisiana courts allow recovery for fear dur-
ing a negligently produced ordeal.' 52 Article 2315 of the
Louisiana Civil Code "recognize[s] that negligence, which
145 Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115, 117 (Ct. App. 1967).
146 Id. at 116.
147 Id. at 116-17. At that time California did not allow recovery for "emotional
distress or mental suffering unaccompanied by physical harm arising from acts
which are solely negligent in nature." Id. at 116.
148 Id. at 117.
119 760 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. 11. 1991).
,so Id. at 1287.
151 746 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984).
152 Id. at 315.
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causes fright and serious personal injury, is actiona-
ble."1 5 3 Anguish during an ordeal is also compensable. 54
However, the cases in Louisiana that recognize mental
anguish typically compensate for post-impact mental
anguish and pain and suffering endured by a decedent. In
contrast, the Haley court stated that it should not be im-
plied that Louisiana would not recognize such pre-impact
fear. Most likely, under a "negligently produced ordeal"
theory, Louisiana would allow recovery. 55
K. TEXAS
Texas is another leading jurisdiction for pre- and post-
impact pain and suffering and mental anguish recoveries.
Texas seems to be following the federal lead in allowing
such damages and has ignored the arbitrary requirements
of impact and physical manifestation. When looking from
a historical perspective, one can see the development of
the legal reasoning.
In a 1982 case, Hurst Aviation v. Junell,'5 6 the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals ruled that a $20,000 award for mental
anguish was not excessive. 157 The appellants argued that
there was no evidence that the pilot survived the impact of
the crash after a midair collision.15 8 Although the court
agreed with the appellants reiteration of the evidence, it
held that there was some evidence that the pilot realized
his plight and therefore suffered mental anguish prior to
his death. 59 The court stated "[c]onsciousness of ap-
proaching death is a proper element to be considered in
-" Id. at 314. Article 2315 states in part: "Every act whatever of man that
causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1977).
1 Haley, 746 F.2d at 314-15.
15-1 See supra note 38 and accompanying text for discussion of the separation of
ordeal theory.
156 642 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
1-57 Id. at 859.
158 Id. at 858.
'-9 Id. at 859. "Unable to control his craft, [the pilot] suffered the horror of his
impending doom as the plane plummeted to earth." Id.
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evaluating mental suffering.' 160 The court allowed the
award to stand, holding that it was the province of the jury
to translate mental anguish, however brief, into monetary
compensation. 61
Two years later, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals again
discussed these issues in Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Yowell.' 6 2
The jury in Yowell concluded that the decedent suffered
mental anguish, and awarded $500,000. The court re-
versed the portion of the judgment for the decedent's
mental anguish immediately prior to the destruction of
the aircraft, on the grounds that it was a survival action
incident to an estate, and as such must be brought in the
probate court rather than in the district court. 63 The
court held that the trial court erred in exercising jurisdic-
tion over the plaintiff's survival action. 64 The court of
appeals also stated that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in allowing the plaintiffs to amend their pleadings on
the last day of trial to include this survival action for
mental anguish damages.' 6 5 On further appeal, the
Supreme Court of Texas addressed these issues. 66 In its
opinion, the court reversed the court of appeals and held
that it was proper to allow a trial amendment "to add ele-
ment of recovery based upon the mental anguish the de-
cedents suffered."' 67 Hence, the Supreme Court of Texas
impliedly recognized that a cause of action for pre-impact
mental anguish does exist in Texas.
I Id.
161 Id.
612 674 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984), rev'd, 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.
1986).
'6 Id. at 455.
Id. at 454.
'. Id. at 460.
166 Yoweil v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1986). While the trial
court awarded the decedents damages for mental anguish suffered, the court of
appeals reversed the trial court's judgment on the grounds that "the decedents
mental anguish is a matter incident to an estate within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the probate court, and therefore, the district court had no jurisdiction over the
claim." Id. at 634.
167 Id.
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In Air Florida, Inc. v. Zondler' 68 the plaintiffs cross-ap-
pealed from the jury's finding that the deceased suffered
no pain or mental anguish before his death. The Zon-
dlers' main witness was a survivor of the crash who testi-
fied that when the plane took off, "it shook so abnormally
that he knew almost immediately that something was
wrong."' 69 He noticed other people were "looking
around" after take-off. °7 0 He also testified "that there
were people crying and moaning after the crash but that
these sounds stopped very quickly."' 7' Yet, the plaintiffs
could not offer any proof that the decedent had knowl-
edge of, or reacted to the crash. In fact, in answer to the
defendant's interrogatories, plaintiffs conceded "that they
did not know whether William Zondler died instantane-
ously in the crash or whether he suffered post-impact con-
scious pain before his death."'' 72 The court held that the
jury's finding of no pain or mental anguish was not
against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. 73
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court's
denial of decedent's pre-crash conscious pain and suffer-
ing in Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. 171
The evidence indicated that the deaths were instantane-
ous, and the record contained no evidence concerning
what the occupants experienced before the crash. 75 Ap-
plying Texas law, the court held that conscious pain and
suffering may be established by circumstantial evi-
dence.' 76 However, the burden is on the plaintiffs to es-
tablish it by a preponderance of the evidence. 77
- 683 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
169 Id. at 774.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 775.
172 Id.
17' Id.
174 828 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1987).
175 Id. at 288 n.43.
176 Id.
177 Id. (citing Moore v. Lillebo, 674 S.W.2d 474, 478 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1986)).
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Therefore, the court was completely within its bounds
when it refused to speculate on pre-impact mental
anguish.
Texas leads the way in pre- and post-impact personal
injury recoveries. More litigation is certain to arise alleg-
ing pre- and post-impact pain and suffering and mental
anguish. Reliance on purely circumstantial evidence,
which Texas courts allow, will open the door for even
more recoveries.
VII. FEDERAL RECOVERIES AND PECULIARITIES
OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
The great wealth of case law on this subject has
emerged from federal courts throughout the United
States. Although federal courts are required to apply the
state law in which they sit, remarkably, many federal
courts delve into issues that have seen little state review.
In most situations, the federal courts make analogies to
existing state law in order to apply state rules to aviation
accidents. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit has seen much
litigation concerning these issues. Ultimately, the Fifth
Circuit established its own precedents and peculiarities.
A. MAXIMUM RECOVERY RULE
The Fifth Circuit established a "maximum recovery
rule" and uses that device to substantially lower jury
awards or to decide whether remittitur is in order.' 78 This
rule does not apply when an award is similar in propor-
tion to at least one other case from that same relevant ju-
risdiction. The court in Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. gave
its own definition of this rule stating:
The "maximum recovery rule" does not necessarily limit
an award to the highest amount previously recognized in
the state. For example, in Haley v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 756 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1984), surviving parents were
awarded $350,000 for the loss of companionship of their
171 See Douglass v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 897 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1990).
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adult child. At that time, the highest recovery under simi-
lar circumstances for a parent in Louisiana was $150,000.
We reduced the award to $200,000 or 33% above the pre-
vious high. Thus, the maximum recovery rule does not
become operative unless the award exceeds 133% of the
highest previous recovery in the state.' 71
This maximum recovery rule is a device to keep awards
low, allowing them to grow at a permissible rate in all sim-
ilar cases. From this analysis, it seems that the conserva-
tive Fifth Circuit is reluctant to award or uphold
substantial personal injury verdicts for pre-impact mental
anguish.
In Douglass the Fifth Circuit analyzed the award for in-
tangible damages (i.e., mental anguish over the loss of a
loved one, and loss of society and companionship) and at-
tempted to apply the maximum recovery rule. Stating
that the airline had an ethical obligation to cite all relevant
state wrongful death cases and all relevant federal law that
was based on state substantive law, the court chastised the
airline for failing to cite a case arising out of the same
crash.18 0 Thus, all relevant cases that are similar in factual
background will be used to determine the limit of the
maximum recovery rule, and both parties have a duty to
present all such cases to the reviewing court.'18
B. THE USE OF REMITrITUR
"Remittitur is a process by which a court compels a
plaintiff to choose between reduction of an excessive ver-
dict and a new trial." 82 Typically, courts will not set aside
an award as excessive, but will order remittitur of about
fifty percent. 8 3 Most courts are reluctant to reverse ajury
179 Id. at 1344 n.14 (citation omitted).
180 Id.
12 Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citing 6AJAMES W. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 59.08[7] (2d ed.
1983)); see also Irene Sann, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
299, 299 (1976).
1"1 David Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64
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award; 8 4 therefore, remittitur is a useful tool.
Although the federal courts have utilized remittitur for
a substantial amount of time, few uniform procedures ex-
ist, and doubts remain about its constitutionality. 8 5
There are five standards from which to measure a proper
remittitur: "(1) fairness to the plaintiff; (2) fairness to the
defendant; (3) judicial economy; (4) the constitutional
preference for jury trials; and (5) non-constitutionally
mandated public policy favoring trial by jury."'' 8 6  It is
solely up to the discretion of the trial judge to determine
whether a verdict is excessive or not.8 7 The standard of
review for such a decision is an abuse of discretion. 8 8
The Fifth Circuit uses remittitur extensively as a device to
lower jury awards for pre-impact pain and suffering and
mental anguish.
Many of the Fifth Circuit cases dealing with remittitur
arose out of the crash of Pan American World Airways
Flight 759 from Moisant International Airport in New Or-
leans, Louisiana. The court combined the Trivelloni-
Lorenzi and Pampin Lopez district court suits against Pan
American in Air Crash New Or/eans I. '9 The Trivelloni jury
awarded $25,000 to each decedent for pre-impact pain
N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 266 (1989). The author conducted an empirical study regard-
ing awards for pain and suffering prior to death. "In the 46 cases studied in this
Article's database where reviewing courts granted remittitur, the average remitti-
tur was 39% of the initial award." Id. at 266 n.46.
-8 See, e.g., Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 783 (5th Cir.
1983). The court stated:
The jury's award is not to be disturbed unless it is entirely dispro-
portionate to the injury sustained. We have expressed the extent of
distortion that warrants intervention by requiring such awards to be
so large as to "shock the judicial conscience," "so gross or inordi-
nately large as to be contrary to right reason," so exaggerated as to
indicate "bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper
motive," or as "clearly exceed[ing] that amount that any reasonable
man could feel the claimant is entitled to."
Id. at 784 (citation omitted).
I'l Sann, supra note 181, at 299.
161 Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
I7 Id. at 302.
Il, Id. at 304.
189 789 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd in relevant part, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
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and suffering, as did the Pampinjury. 90 The court of ap-
peals found sufficient evidence for this award, apparently
relying on the court's decision to award damages in Prege-
ant and Haley. However, the appeals court stated that the
evidence in those cases exceeded evidence presented to
the Trivelloni and Pampin juries.' 9 ' The juries heard the
testimony of two women who were on the ground near
the point of impact. One woman testified that she heard
one of the engines malfunction. She heard trees cracking
and saw the wings of the plane perpendicular to the
ground moments before it crashed and burned. The
court held this evidence "provided an adequate basis
from which the jury could draw reasonable inferences
about the mental state of the passengers in the final
seconds before the disastrous impact."'' 92 Yet the appel-
late court was convinced that the $25,000 award for pre-
impact suffering of the decedents exceeded the maximum
recovery rule, and the award should be limited to $7500
for each decedent. 193 These awards were affirmed later
the next year.194
The court then discussed testimony concerning post-
impact damages. Evidence was put forward that witnesses
heard screams coming from the burning fuselage after the
plane crashed and before it exploded. The pathologist re-
ported that the decedent Alvarez died from third degree
burns over ninety-five percent of her body. There was no
limb severance and no massive traumatic injuries like the
other decedents seated beside her. The court found the
jury had a reasonable basis to infer that the decedent was
conscious briefly and suffered post-impact pain and
suffering. 195
-o Id. at 1095.
'9' Id. at 1099.
192 Id. at 1098.
'93 Id. at 1099.
194 Air Crash New Orleans I, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987). The court devoted
most of its time in this second case to the issue of forum non conveniens.
'95 Air Crash New Orleans 1, 789 F.2d at 1099.
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In Air Crash New Orleans H 96 the jury awarded $1.1 mil-
lion to each of the Eymard children. 197 This general ver-
dict included an award for pre-impact pain and suffering
of their parents, who died in this crash. The court could
not order a remittitur because it was a general verdict and
there was no way of determining what the jury meant to
award for each item of damage. The court's only option
was to vacate the general award and remand for new
trial. 198 In dicta, the court restated the Trivelloni maxi-
mum allowable recovery of $7500 for each decedent and
included that amount in its table of maximum awards for
each child as a guide for the district court to follow on
remand. 199
In Brun-Jacobo v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. 200 the
jury awarded $20,000 for the pre-impact mental anguish
of each decedent. 20  At the second trial, 20 2 the jury re-
turned with an award of $25,000. In its decision to rein-
state the original verdict, the Fifth Circuit pointed out the
plaintiff had not even complained of this part of the ver-
dict in his original motion for new trial and, since these
original verdicts were within the range of permissible
awards, the district court had abused its discretion in or-
dering a new trial. °3 Essentially, the court held that the
original verdict was more than sufficient based upon the
meager evidence provided. 4
1 - 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986).
197 Id. at 1235.
198 Id. at 1237.
199 Id.
2-0 847 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1988).
201 Id.
202 This case was retried due to supposed bias and prejudice.
203 Id. at 246-47.
2-4 Id. at 245. The court's analysis is evident from the language that it uses to
discredit the relevant testimony and justify lowering the jury award:
While, as Pampin illustrates, not all death cases from the same air-
craft crash have the same proof on this issue, nevertheless they are
usually quite similar as to pre-impact mental anguish, for the proof is
generally (and was here) entirely circumstantial and only a very brief
time (measured in a few seconds here) is involved.
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Finally, in Air Crash New Orleans II1205 the jury awarded
$100,000 to Mr. Giancontieri for the pre-death pain and
suffering of his wife, but allowed no award for pre-death
pain and suffering for his deceased children. °6 Mr. Gian-
contieri then accepted a remittitur of $15,000. The Fifth
Circuit reversed this award claiming that there was no di-
rect or circumstantial evidence proving pre-death pain
and suffering. °7
Taking all of these cases together, it seems quite clear
that the Fifth Circuit is trying to hold the line on pre-im-
pact pain and suffering recoveries. Their maximum re-
covery rule essentially disregards jury deliberation of
damages and then substitutes what the judiciary thinks is a
fair and reasonable award. It can be argued that such
rules have restrained the inevitable progression of pre-
and post-impact pain and suffering awards.
VII. FORECASTS AND TRENDS
As one can see from the many cases, causes of action
seeking pre- and/or post-impact pain and suffering and
mental anguish are increasing in number. It seems likely
that most, if not all, states will eventually recognize pre-
and post-impact mental anguish because these damages
are now being recognized in the federal courts.
The only possible hindrance that may affect the pursuit
of these damages is the physical injury or physical mani-
festation requirements that are necessary for recovery in a
few states. The trend clearly is to abolish these archaic
requirements because they inhibit the effectiveness of the
tort compensation system. The historical justification of
reducing fraudulent claims is not applicable, especially in
the case of airline accidents where the possibility of fraud-
ulent claims seems slight. There will also be less reliance
on this physical impact requirement as more states recog-
205 767 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1985).
2- Id. at 1153.
207 Id. at 1157.
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nize negligent infliction of emotional distress. °8
Although some argue that pre-impact mental anguish is
immeasurable and uncertain 2 0 9 emotional damages are
coming to the forefront of America's collective conscious-
ness; therefore, more courts will likely recognize these
types of damages. Logically, the expansion of the time
frame to include injury before the impact, the impact it-
self, and any post-impact pain and suffering up until death
would include both physical and mental injuries.
An increase in recovery amounts is foreseeable. As evi-
denced by the Fifth Circuit's maximum recovery rule,
damage awards can increase exponentially by up to 133
percent. 210 Even though the Fifth Circuit makes a con-
certed effort to reduce awards by using remittitur and the
maximum recovery rule, many cases with circumstantial
evidence are now allowed recovery.
In allowing pre- or post-impact pain and suffering and
mental anguish, courts are now more likely to accept
somewhat speculative evidence that, at best, is only cir-
cumstantial. Many cases state that eyewitness testimony is
not necessary for recovery since eyewitness testimony is
impossible to obtain in most air crash disasters. Yet
courts continue to require that evidence presented must
have some reasonable basis for allowing a jury to infer
that the decedent experienced pre- or post-impact pain
208 As an interesting side note, Texas has recently refused to recognize a cause
of action based upon negligent infliction of emotional distress. Boyles v. Kerr, 855
S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993).
20- Fuchsberg, supra note 11, at 34. Fuchsberg points out the obvious problems
in judging pre-impact mental anguish stating:
The simple fact is that not all human beings react with fear and ter-
ror in times of peril. We humans are a spectrum and react differ-
ently in situations of danger. One man's meat of courage is another
man's poison of fear. We have different thresholds. Some of us are
more stoical than others. If a twentieth century Hamlet had been
buckled to the fateful seat in [the Lin] crash, and became aware of his
peril, his reaction would be uncertain. For all we know, he might be
philosophically reciting the equivalent of "To be or not to be" when
disaster struck.
Id.
210 See supra notes 178-207 and accompanying text.
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and suffering or mental anguish. If circumstantial evi-
dence or something greater is required in all cases, plain-
tiffs will be forced to explore new avenues of gathering
evidence. This could lead to more extensive use of
experts.
Obviously, the use of experts is necessary in establish-
ing how the crash occurred, the impact on the passenger
cabin, and any physical sensations the decedent might
have experienced. The use of an accident reconstruction-
ist can establish solid evidence meriting recovery. Also,
psychological experts are used to speculate on the mental
anguish such physical sensations cause and the passen-
gers' likely reaction to such stress; they are vital partici-
pants in such a cause of action.
As a few of the cases analyzed herein have shown, plain-
tiffs are now relying on the National Transportation
Safety Board reports as evidence to satisfy court require-
ments of proof. Such reports should have a justifying ef-
fect to many jurors because the reports come from an
official agency that is not biased in their assessment and
report of the crash. Both the jury and the judiciary will
rely heavily on such reports. There are, however, some
restrictions placed on the use of this report. National
Transportation Safety Board determinations of probable
cause are inadmissible at trial.21 ' Such a pronouncement
of cause might unduly influence the jury and uncondition-
ally validate the plaintiff's theory. Although most airlines
stipulate to their own negligence, an NTSB showing of
wanton or willful negligence as the cause of the crash
would give more credibility to the plaintiff's request for
punitive damages. In the future, punitive damages might
be awarded based upon evidence of pre- or post-impact
21, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1988) states that: "No part of any report or re-
ports of the National Transportation Safety Board relating to any accident or the
investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action
for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports."
Courts have been reluctant to apply this language strictly. Usually the factual re-
port is made public. It is the finding of ultimate or probable cause which courts
will not allow into evidence.
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pain and suffering. Such highly emotional evidence might
sway a jury to find gross negligence.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND QUESTIONS
Some argue that judges are wisely trying to eliminate
excessive awards that burden airlines economically and
that the limited use of remittitur is acceptable. Financial
liability for airline accidents can be enormous. 12 As re-
coveries for pain and suffering or pre- and post-impact
mental anguish increase, so does the cost of insurance
premiums that airlines have to pay. Airlines can pass such
costs on to consumers through ticket prices, or they can
try to respond by cutting internal costs (i.e., lay-offs of
employees, less flights, or reduction of employee bene-
fits). In a struggling economy, less air travel by consum-
ers can increase the impact that such cost increases have
on the presently unstable airline industry. If airlines are
forced to pay higher awards to each decedent's estate,
then higher pre- or post-impact pain and suffering or
mental anguish awards are possibly contributing to the
present airline industry crisis. Such a belief could explain
why the Fifth Circuit has continually remitted such
awards.
The foregoing analysis is attenuated at best, however.
There is no evidence in aviation case law that supports an
economic reason for remitting awards. It seems that a
conservative judiciary is merely trying to control a grow-
ing area of recovery.
Others might argue that the judicial system is being
compromised by eliminating, or in the very least using re-
mittitur to lower, pre- or post-impact pain and suffering
or mental anguish. As Abraham Fuchsberg explains, "We
212 In fact, recent airline disasters have resulted in staggering damage amounts.
For example, Delta had claims against it totalling between $150 million and $200
million dollars arising out of the 1985 L-10 11 crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Interna-
tional Airport. In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport on Aug. 2, 1985, 720
F. Supp. 1258, 1261-62 (N.D. Tex. 1989), aft'd, 919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 276 (1991).
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must avoid a blind spot in our quest for full damages."2 3
Clearly something in our system fails when recovery is
contingent upon where a passenger is seated on an air-
plane. 4 Although remittitur is quite common in the judi-
cial scheme today, some would argue that remittitur keeps
a truly injured plaintiff from receiving just compensation.
Remittitur can be a valuable tool in ending litigation by
encouraging a plaintiff to settle their case or face re-trial.
But the expanded use of remittitur in airline accidents
could be interfering with jury awards that are reasonable
and reflect common consensus. As of this date, jury
awards for pre-impact pain and suffering have been some-
what conservative, usually in the amounts of $10,000 to
$50,000 dollars. If awards for pre-impact or post-impact
mental anguish substantially increase into the millions,
then the argument for the use of remittitur would be
much stronger.
It can also be argued that the act of disturbing jury ver-
dicts disregards the moral outlook and perceptions that
society holds. Awards for pre-impact fear or post-impact
mental anguish reflect a humanistic desire to help those
suffering such a horrible fate. The pain and suffering ex-
perienced as a result of a spectacular air crash is
unimaginable. So it is juries, made up of peers, who must
put a price tag upon what the decedent suffered. Clearly,
their own fears weigh heavily in this determination.
Although this argument could be used to support the use
of remittitur, such a moral component in awarding dam-
ages must be allowed. 5 The court in In re Inflight Explo-
sion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching Athens,
213 Fuchsberg, supra note 9, at 29.
214 Compare Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.
1984) with Shatkin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 727 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1984).
215 Commentators also point out that awards for conscious pain and suffering
will tend to be larger when the victim dies. "Near misses diminish the value of
conscious pain and suffering." Fuchsberg, supra note 9, at 35. This is possibly due
to the fact that in death cases attorneys can dramatize and speculate on the dece-
dent's terror, while a survivor might not emotionally affect the jury as much. Id. at
36.
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Greece on April 2, 198616 acknowledged such fears when it
allowed a pain and suffering award for the decedent, Mr.
Ospina. The court stated:
The jury award represents the sublimation of our own
horror and our substitution, through imagination, for Mr.
Ospina in his final moments. It is as if we ourselves are
falling to our deaths. This constitutes our recognition of
the importance of human life and dignity up to the mo-
ment of death. The compensation owed the dying Mr. Os-
pina is one of his assets, which may be collected by his
widow for his estate.21 7
With advances made in modem science, mental injury
and anguish are now clearly identifiable. But when a pas-
senger dies in a plane crash, proof of mental injury is al-
most impossible. If no one survives the crash, then who
knows what the decedent experienced immediately prior
to death? Again, as the cases show, the judiciary should
be willing to make concessions in this area. The physical
manifestation requirement should be abolished. 2 "8 The
decedent will never be able to testify as to what he exper-
ienced. Problems of proof arise when mental anguish
prior to impact must be physically manifested in some
manner.
The "impact rule" should also be abolished. Requiring
a victim to be physically impacted ignores the whole con-
cept of mental injuries. Mental anguish in contemplation
of death can be more harrowing than a brief physical
impact.
Some commentators argue that allowing pre-impact
mental anguish would increase the likelihood of fraud.
This restatement rationale is not applicable if one ana-
216 778 F. Supp. 625 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd sub noma. Ospina v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
217 Id. at 641.
218 Clearly, a passenger on board the United Flight that crashed at Sioux City
experienced unimaginable horror and terror as the plane continually circled to-
wards the runway and prepared for a crash landing. If there was no proof of that
mental anguish, the physical manifestation rule would prevent a deceased passen-
ger from recovery.
1993] MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES 447
lyzes the reality of a plane crash. Anyone who has knowl-
edge that they are about to die most likely undergoes a
tremendous amount of genuine stress.
The previous survey of states illustrates the recent pur-
suit and acceptance of pre-and post-impact pain and suf-
fering and mental anguish. In recent years, use of these
theories accelerated, and states are now struggling to de-
velop their own case law. In the future, more concise
rules will emerge to better define these concepts.
Although the evidentiary obstacles might seem enormous,
it is definitely the most advantageous time to set new
precedents in this area.

